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Abstract
We propose a methodology for assessing the neutrality of corporate
tax reform proposals in an open economy. The methodology identifies
variation in effective tax rates to assess the proximity of a tax system
to capital export neutrality (CEN) and to market neutrality (MN, which
holds if all potential competitors in a single market face the same effective
tax rate). We apply the methodology to two reform options in the EU.
Optional international loss consolidation would move the EU tax system
away from both CEN and MN. The proposed common consolidated cor-
porate tax base (CCCTB) has mixed effects which depend on the precise
comparisons made.
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1 Introduction
This paper sets out a methodology for assessing the neutrality of corporation
taxes in open economies. It focuses on international distortions to location,
ownership and competition generated by differences in tax regimes between
countries. The methodology compares the distribution of firm-specific effective
tax rates in two dimensions. The first explores the extent to which location
decisions of individual companies are likely to be affected by taxes. The second
explores the extent to which competition between companies may be affected
by taxes. The paper applies this methodology to compare existing corporation
tax systems in the Europe Union with alternatives that have been proposed,
including the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
The methodology developed here assesses the extent to which existing or
potential corporation tax systems are consistent with two concepts of neutrality
in an open economy. Such concepts of neutrality have a long history, dating
back to Musgrave (1959). Traditionally, the debate has been about the relative
merits of capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (see
Richman, 1963). The more general notion of production efficiency usually im-
plies a preference for CEN: this holds if decisions by investors as to where to
locate their investments are not affected by taxes. More recently, Desai and
Hines (2003) have pointed to the importance of a concept of capital ownership
neutrality. The idea here is that if efficiency of production varies across po-
tential owners, then an efficient tax system would also not distort ownership
patterns. Beyond this, Devereux (2008) addresses the possibility that two firms
that are not equally efficient nevertheless co-exist and compete in the same
market. A more general neutrality concept, market neutrality (MN), which
goes beyond the concept of Desai and Hines, is that tax should not distort
the nature of the competition between firms. If two firms compete with each
other in the same market, then MN would only hold if both firms face the same
overall effective tax rates on their investment. Note that these two firms could
produce in different countries, but export to the same third country.
The main contribution of the paper is to measure the extent to which ex-
isting and potential tax systems exhibit CEN and MN. Our broad approach is
to consider the distribution of effective tax rates across alternative investment
locations, and across potentially competing firms. To evaluate proximity to
CEN, we calculate the effective tax rates for any single company facing the
opportunity of investing in each of the 27 EU member states. We summarise
the distribution of effective tax rates faced by that company by the standard
deviation across the 27 effective tax rates. We take a smaller standard deviation
indicate a greater proximity to CEN. We analyse the values of these standard
deviations for a large number of companies, resident throughout the EU. To
evaluate proximity to MN, we need to identify a representative tax rate for
each company. We follow two routes, using the minimum and average across
the 27 faced by each company. Allowing each company in the EU to serve the
market in any member state implies that we need to compare these represen-
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tative tax rates across all companies. We take a narrower distribution across
companies as indicating closer proximity to MN. We discuss this approach in
more detail in Section 2 below.
For each of these comparisons, we need measures of effective tax rates. We
develop two measures based on the standard approach of considering a hypo-
thetical investment project set out by Devereux and Griffith (1999): an effective
average tax rate (EATR) and an effective marginal tax rate, the effect of which
is summarised by the cost of capital (CoC). We follow Egger et al (2009) in
measuring a company-specific effective tax rate, based on the company’s ex-
isting asset mix, choice of finance and ownership pattern. We abstract from
examining distortions to the allocation of capital between different assets, and
the source of finance. We extend the measure to introduce uncertainty by al-
lowing the possibility that the investment project may generate a loss.
We are not aware of any other paper which addresses these issues. The
closest to the approach in this paper is that of Devereux and Pearson (1995),
who analyse the impact of a number of potential tax harmonization scenarios
on production efficiency. However, that approach is based on country-specific,
rather than firm-specific, effective tax rates. It does not therefore reflect dif-
ferences between companies located in the same country. Such differences may
affect the assessment of CEN, but more importantly they have a direct impli-
cation for the assessment of MN. Egger and Loretz (2009) show that a uniform
tax reform can have very different effects on effective tax rates across companies
depending on, for example, their asset mix and their sources of finance. For
some reforms, such as the CCCTB, such differences are exacerbated for multi-
national companies by different ownership patterns across countries. Further,
the Devereux and Pearson approach does not allow for the hypothetical invest-
ment to generate a loss, and so is not able to consider the key element of loss
consolidation considered in this paper.
We use this methodology to analyse and compare three different tax sys-
tems: (a) the actual system in 2008; (b) a system which allows (but does not
require) companies within the same multinational group to offset losses against
profits generated in the group in another country; and (c) the CCCTB pro-
posal, which would oblige companies to consolidate all profits across the EU,
and allocate them back to individual countries using an apportionment factor.
The methodology for developing effective tax rates in each of these cases is
described in more detail in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the company level data used in this paper. Section 5
presents the results, analysing the proximity of each of these tax systems to
CEN and MN, and Section 6 concludes. The main results are as follows. The
introduction of optional international loss consolidation would increase the vari-
ation in effective tax burdens, and would represent a move away from both CEN
and MN. However, the effects of combining international loss consolidation with
a common tax base and formula apportionment in the CCCTB are more subtle;
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they depend on the precise comparisons made and the assumptions used. In
our base case, the CCCTB would move the tax system slightly in the direction
of CEN for EATRs, but away from CEN for CoCs. For MN, the results de-
pend on whether the average or minimum measure of effective tax rate is used.
Where the minimum rate is used, there is a significant movement towards MN,
which reflects the fact that there would be fairly common minimum tax rates in
the EU achievable by many companies. However, based on the average effective
tax rates across locations, there is a small movement away from MN.
2 Neutrality concepts and production efficiency
This section sets out the broad approach of the paper. It begins with a brief
summary of the literature investigating efficiency and neutrality properties of
corporation taxes in an open economy, and identifies the two concepts of neu-
trality used in this paper. It then sets out the empirical approach used here to
investigate how close existing and potential systems are to exhibiting these two
forms of neutrality.
2.1 Conceptual framework
The starting point for any analysis of optimal tax systems is the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) framework which demonstrated that, within a single country, it
is optimal to preserve production efficiency. This holds when it is not possible
to increase total output by reallocating inputs to different uses, and implies that
the marginal pre-tax rate of return is the same on all investments. However, the
Diamond-Mirrlees theorem relies on two critical assumptions: that there are no
restrictions on the use of tax instruments available to the government, and that
economic rent is fully taxed at 100% (or there is no economic rent).1 Keen
and Piekola (1996) analyse optimal tax rates between co-operating countries
when economic rents exist but cannot be taxed at a rate of 100%. In this case,
the optimal tax system depends on similar factors to those identified by Horst
(1980); namely the elasticity of the supply of savings and the elasticity of the
demand for capital in each jurisdiction. Keen and Piekola also show that the
optimal tax structure depends on the rate at which economic rents are taxed.
A further caveat was introduced in an international context by Keen and
Wildasin (2004). They point out that the Diamond-Mirrlees model does not
directly apply in an international setting, since there is no longer a single gov-
ernment budget constraint, but each country has its own budget constraint.
They analyse the case in which lump sum transfers between governments are
ruled out, but where transfers can instead take place via trade taxes and subsi-
dies. Under these circumstances, it may be the case that the optimal (Pareto-
efficient) tax system does not generate production efficiency. However, as ar-
gued by Edwards (2005), if the aim is to generate a global optimum, it is not
clear why governments should co-operate by adjusting their trade taxes, rather
1See Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971).
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than agreeing to lump-sum transfers. In the latter case, we are effectively re-
turned to the Diamond-Mirrlees setting of a single budget constraint.
Although the global optimality of production efficiency is an important is-
sue, we leave these caveats to one side and instead focus on the implications
for the design of international taxes on profit of a requirement for production
efficiency. We consider each country to be a small open economy, with access
to international portfolio investment. Abstracting from risk, this implies that
all companies are required to earn the same rate of return after source-based
taxes on capital income. Specifically, if corporation taxes are source-based, but
personal taxes are residence-based, then the post-corporation tax rate of return
is fixed for any company. We also assume that companies can choose where
to locate their investments, and can also supply third country markets through
exporting.
In this setting, Devereux (2008) discusses the properties of international
corporation tax systems that would generate production efficiency. It is clearly
the case that if the post-tax rate of return is fixed and production efficiency
requires the pre-tax rate of return to be the same on all possible investments,
then production efficiency requires the effective tax wedge between pre- and
post-tax rates of return to be the same for all possible investments. This re-
quires the complete harmonisation of all source-based corporation taxes.
However, in this paper we split this requirement into two elements, which
illuminate the nature of the proposed tax reforms. The first element is capital
export neutrality (CEN) (applied to corporation tax): that is, any individual
company must face the same effective tax rate on any investment, irrespective
of the location of that investment. In the absence of CEN, taxes may induce a
company to produce in a less efficient location.2
The second element we consider we refer to as market neutrality (MN). This
is related to concepts of capital ownership neutrality (CON) of Devereux (1990)
and Desai and Hines, (2003). The concept of MN is that the tax system should
not favour one company over another company with which it competes. If this
did not hold, then a less efficient company may have a competitive advantage
over a more efficient company. This of course requires there to be differences
in efficiency between companies, a point emphasised by Desai and Hines (2003)
in developing their concept of CON, which is that the tax system should not
prevent a more efficient owner acquiring an asset from a less efficient owner. If
all assets were indeed owned by their most efficient owner, then distortion to
competition would be irrelevant in this context. However, this is clearly not
the case in practice: companies with different levels of efficiency do co-exist. If
they do co-exist, then production efficiency requires the broader concept that
2In a setting without a distinction between portfolio and direct international investment,
CEN can be sufficient to achieve production efficiency. However, with a fixed post-tax rate of
return it is not a sufficient condition.
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there is no distortion in the market, so that the competitive advantage of more
efficient companies is not undermined. In the absence of international trade, the
condition for the absence of any distortion in the market is equivalent to capital
import neutrality (Richman, 1963): that all firms operating in a given juris-
diction should face the same effective tax rate. But with international trade,
companies producing in different countries may nevertheless compete with each
other in third countries. In that case, production efficiency requires that any
company competing (or potentially competing) with any other in a given mar-
ket must face the same effective tax rate; this is market neutrality.
Both CEN and MN are required for production efficiency. By investigating
the proximity of the existing and hypothetical tax systems to each of these, we
aim to identify the strengths and weaknesses of alternative tax systems.
2.2 Empirical measures
To assess proximity to CEN and MN, we estimate and use company-specific
measures of effective tax rates for a large number of European firms when they
potentially invest either at home or in any of the other 26 EU member states.
We measure the extent to which tax systems meet the requirement of CEN by
calculating the standard deviation of the distribution of these 27 effective tax
rates for each individual company. We then consider the distribution of these
standard deviations across all of the companies in our dataset. CEN holds in
the case of a single company when its standard deviation is zero, and CEN
would apply throughout the EU if all of these standard deviations were zero.
More generally, we consider that a potential reform moves the overall system
towards CEN if the distribution of standard deviations moves towards zero.
We do not explicitly define a single measure to capture such a movement in the
distribution of standard deviations. Instead, we present the distribution and
consider its properties in the context of understanding the effects of the reform.
To consider how close existing and potential tax systems are to MN, we
identify a single effective tax rate facing each company as it competes in any
potential market. A difficulty is that we have 27 effective tax rates for each
company, corresponding to investment in each EU member state. To analyse
competition between companies, however, we need to summarise these into a
single figure for each company. But we do not know which country a company
will choose for the location of production to serve a particular market. We
consider two possibilities. First, we assume that the company is equally likely
to choose each member state, and we therefore take the average across the 27
effective tax rates. Second, we assume that the company chooses the most tax-
efficient location for production; in this case we use the minimum effective tax
rate for each company. To measure proximity to MN, we consider the variation
in the distribution of these single tax rates across companies. If there were
no variation at all, then the tax system would exhibit MN. More generally, we
consider that a potential reform moves the overall system towards MN if the
distribution of these single tax rates becomes narrower. As for CEN, we do
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not summarise this in a single measure, but again present the distribution and
interpret the effects of any particular reform.
One important issue in analysing both CEN and MN is whether the appro-
priate effective tax rate is an average or marginal rate. Devereux and Griffith
(1998, 2003) point out that both of these could be relevant in determining the
size of the capital stock owned by a company in each country. The effective
average tax rate (EATR) is the relevant measure for the extensive investment
margin: the discrete choice of where to locate a new activity. In the context
of this analysis of this paper, this is the decision as to in which of the 27 EU
member states to locate a new plant. Conditional on this choice, the inten-
sive margin - the scale of investment in the chosen country - depends on the
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), or equivalently, the cost of capital (CoC).3
Both the EATR and the CoC are relevant for assessing CEN and MN. We
interpret CEN as implying more than simply that the extensive decision margin
is unaffected by tax. Instead, we interpret it as indicating that the allocation
of capital across countries is unaffected by tax; and as noted above, the alloca-
tion of capital should depend on both the EATR and the CoC. Similarly, the
impact of tax on the price charged by a participant in a market may depend
both on where production takes place and the scale of investment: hence MN
also depends on both the EATR and the CoC. In principle, for any company,
we could combine the EATR and CoC into a single measure summarising the
impact of tax on its contribution to the overall allocation of capital or compet-
itiveness. However, to do so, it would be necessary to know the importance of
each measure for each decision. In the absence of such information, we therefore
consider each measure separately.
Another important issue is that we use company-specific effective tax rates.
As described below, the effective tax rates are based on a hypothetical new
investment undertaken by an existing company. We follow Egger et al (2009)
in assuming that the nature of this new investment matches the existing fea-
tures of the company in terms of its mix of assets and use of alternative sources
of finance. That is, the new investment is comprised of different assets in the
same proportion as the company already owns; and the debt-equity ratio used
to finance the new investment is also the same as in the existing company. We
do not allow the company to choose the nature of its investment in response to
tax reliefs available in each potential host country.
Our estimates of company-specific tax rates are intended to reflect differ-
ences in the tax treatment of companies even within a single country, since
companies have different characteristics. Given these different characteristics,
it is possible that two companies resident in the same country face different tax
incentives in choosing to locate either at home or in a foreign country. This
3These are equivalent in their effects if each company requires a given post-tax rate of
return.
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implies that the extent to which CEN holds may be different for the two com-
panies, even though they are resident in the same country. Clearly, too, the
concept of MN is based on there being differences across companies. While there
may be many factors creating differences in efficiency between companies, it is
possible that some of these differences are reflected in the factors that we are
able to incorporate into our company-specific measures. To this extent, then
variation in effective tax rates even within a country may reflect absence of MN.
A final issue arises in respect of modelling of one particular tax system -
that based on formula apportionment, such as the CCCTB. In this case, profits
in the new investment are consolidated with profits from existing capital, and
an overall statutory tax rate applied to the aggregate profit. This overall tax
rate is a weighted average of the rates in each of the countries in which a
company operates, where the weights depend on the formula used. This raises
the problem if identifying the appropriate weight to give the new hypothetical
investment, which we discuss further below.
3 Effective tax rates under different systems
The measures of effective average and marginal tax rates used here build on the
cost of capital approach of Jorgensen (1963) and Hall and Jorgensen (1967),
which was further developed by King and Fullerton (1984) and by Devereux and
Griffith (1999). In line with Egger et al (2009) we apply firm- and industry-
specific weights to exploit firm heterogeneity. We also introduce uncertainty
in the outcome to allow possible losses in the hypothetical investment project.
A formal presentation is provided in Devereux and Loretz (2008a); here we
summarise the approach.
3.1 The current system
We consider a one-period investment by a company which takes the same form
as its existing operations in terms of capital structure and asset mix. We further
assume that this investment is conducted through a new subsidiary in which an
asset is purchased in period 0 and makes an uncertain return in period 1. We
assume that there are two possible outcomes, one positive and one negative.
In the good outcome, a high return is earned. In the bad outcome, a negative
return is earned. Denoting the probability of the good outcome to be q, the
rate of return in the good outcome to be g, and the rate of return in the bad
outcome to be b, then the expected return is p = qg+ (1− q)b. In the standard
approach to estimating the cost of capital, for q = 1, the cost of capital is the
break-even value of g which generates a NPV of zero. Given our assumption
of an uncertain outcome, it is necessary to assume values for q and b, and then
solve for the break-even value of g. In the standard approach for estimating the
EATR, for q = 1, it is necessary to choose a specific value of g which generates
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a positive NPV. In this case, it is necessary to assume values of q, g and b.4
The basic mechanics of the hypothetical investment are as follows. First
consider the case in which the parent company establishes a new subsidiary at
home. The subsidiary undertakes investment of 1 unit in period 0, financed
partly by issuing new equity and partly by borrowing. The investment gener-
ates a stream of depreciation allowances over time, the value of which depends
on the allowance rate permitted for the asset mix chosen by the firm and the
tax rate, t. The investment generates a return in period 1 which, if positive, is
subject to tax at rate t. If it is negative, it will generate a taxable loss, which
we discuss below. Interest paid in period 1 on borrowing in period 0 generally
receives relief at rate t. We hold the capital stock unaffected in all other peri-
ods.5 There may be differences in effective tax rates across firms, even though
firms are subject to the same tax law, due to variation in the asset mix used,
and the amount of borrowing.
In general, if the subsidiary is in a foreign country, the approach is the same.
However, the firm has additional options for financing, including lending by the
parent. The interest paid on such debt would be deductible against corporation
tax by the subsidiary, but may be subject to a withholding tax on payment to
the parent, and the parent may be subject to tax on the interest received. Div-
idends paid by the subsidiary to the parent would also potentially be subject
to withholding taxes and a further tax on receipt by the parent.
Because the subsidiary is new, the allowance received in period 0 creates
an initial taxable loss. In the case of a domestic subsidiary we assume loss
relief is allowed within the country, so that this loss can be set against taxable
income in the parent company. Similarly for the domestic subsidiary, in the
case of the bad outcome the taxable loss generated in period 1 is assumed to
be set against the taxable income in the parent. However, under existing rules
there is generally no international loss consolidation, which implies that any loss
arising in the foreign subsidiary could not normally be set against the profits
of the parent. If the parent has an existing subsidiary in the location of the
new investment, then we assume that losses can be set against profits in that
existing subsidiary. However, if this is not the case, then losses will generally
have to be carried forward to set against future profits. In the case of the bad
outcome in period 1, there will be no future profit, and so there is no relief for
losses in the host country. However, after the losses are materialized, they may
be offset against the existing profits in the parent company.6 In general, the
4In general, we assume q = 0.8 and b = −0.2. For the EATR calculations, we also assume
g = 0.3, which implies that p = 0.2 as is commonly assumed.
5In the good outcome, this is achieved by a reduction in new investment which we assume
would otherwise have taken place. In the bad outcome, it is achieved by the sale of the asset,
as the the subsidiary is closed down. The distinction between these two approaches is relevant
only to the tax position. In particular, if the asset is sold, there may be a balancing charge if
the sale proceeds exceeds the value for tax purposes. In this summary we neglect the issues
of inflation and changes in relative prices.
6Austria and Denmark already forms of international loss consolidation, which we abstract
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lack of immediate loss relief tends to increase the effective tax burden. Again
the firm-specific composition of the investment will partly determine the size of
this effect.
3.2 With voluntary cross-border loss consolidation
Now consider how the effective tax burden would change if the firm could choose
whether to consolidate the losses of the foreign subsidiary with the parent.7
The effective tax burden for a new subsidiary in the home country will not be
affected, since we assume that it is already possible to offset the losses under
the current system and will generally be beneficial to do so unless there is an
anticipated change in the tax rate. However, for an investment project abroad
the firm now faces a decision. Immediate cross-border loss offset in period 0
provides a certain tax relief against the home country tax rate, t. If the losses
are left in the subsidiary and carried forward into period 1 then in the case of
a good outcome, they can be set of against income arising in period 1 at the
foreign country tax rate, t∗. If t∗ < t, then it is always beneficial to consolidate
immediately. However, if t∗ is sufficiently larger than t, then the gain from
offsetting the loss at the higher tax rate may offset the cost of the delay of one
period, and the risk that a bad outcome may occur. Compared to the current
system, then, a system of voluntary loss consolidation may - or may not - permit
a reduction in the tax burden.
3.3 With loss consolidation and formula apportionment
Finally consider a more major tax reform, namely the introduction of a Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).8 This would entail harmo-
nization of the definition of the corporate tax base across EU countries and
also an obligatory system of consolidation and formula apportionment.9 The
harmonization of the depreciation allowances eliminates one form of variation
arising from investing in different countries. In addition, there are no longer
any tax consequences of financing the subsidiary through lending from the par-
ent, since the cash flows net out in the consolidation process. Further, since
from for simplicity reasons. Further the loss treatment we describe here is in compliance with
the ruling in the Marks & Spencer v. Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes (ECJ Case C-446/03),
demanding that losses can be used in the parent company if there is no possibility of carrying
them forward in the subsidiary.
7There process of corporate tax harmonisation within the European Union has been slow
and has faced considerable opposition from Member States. So the European Commission has
adopted a strategy of stepwise reform proposals. Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa (2006) discusses interna-
tional loss consolidation and various forms of formula apportionment. We take the stepwise
approach literally and analyse first the introduction of voluntary loss consolidation and then
the full CCCTB.
8This was initially considered in European Commission (2001), but has been developed
over time and we focus mainly on the 2007 statement by the CCCTB working group.
9Specifically we use the following assumptions as discussed by the CCCTB Working Group
(2007): Buildings are depreciated according to a straight line schedule over 40 years, plant
and machinery according to a declining balance scheme at a rate of 20 percent, intangibles are
written down straight line over 15 years and inventories are valuated according to a weighted
average.
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losses in the subsidiary are automatically consolidated with the parent, there is
no longer a disadvantage from foreign investment arising through the existence
of taxable losses in the subsidiary. The tax disadvantage created by possibil-
ity of the loss-making bad outcome in the foreign subsidiary is therefore avoided.
However, the apportionment of profits to individual countries based on an
arbitrary formula raises a new issue. In particular, the tax rate faced by the
company as a whole depends on where the apportionment factors are located.
If some of the apportionment factors are located in the new subsidiary, then
there is an important feedback effect, since the tax rate applied to existing
taxable income changes as a result of the new investment. To understand this
effect, suppose that a proportion λ of the apportionment factors are located in
the new subsidiary, and a proportion 1− λ are located in the parent company.
Then the overall tax rate is τ = λt∗ + (1− λ)t. Now suppose that the taxable
income of the parent is P and the taxable income of the subsidiary is S. Tax
due in the subsidiary is τS. The feedback effect is the change in tax in the
parent, (τ − t)P . In general, then, to estimate the effect of introducing formula
apportionment, it is necessary to know both λ, and the ratio of taxable income
in the parent to taxable income in the subsidiary, P/S. A natural assumption
to make, however, is that the ratio of taxable incomes is equal to the ratio of
apportionment factors: P/S = (1 − λ)/λ. This is consistent with the general
approach used in the paper that the new investment is a proportional expansion
of the existing company, so that for example, the asset mix is the same. Making
this assumption, the two tax effects sum to t∗S: that is, only the tax rate in the
subsidiary country (and taxable income in the subsidiary) is relevant for the
new investment.10 This also applies if the existing company is a group located
in more than one country. We make this assumption in the empirical work
below. However, for comparison, in section 5.3 we also consider the opposite
case where the tax effects depend only on the parent company’s tax rate (or
more generally, the existing tax rate of the group). This occurs if λ = 0, so that
no apportionment factors are located in the country of the new investment. In
this case, the ratio of the taxable incomes becomes irrelevant and the sum of
the tax effects is tS.
4 Data
We use the largest available set of firm level data, Orbis, provided by the Bureau
van Dijk (BvD). We begin with information on financial data and ownership
for around one million large companies over the years 2001 to 2007. As we
use information at the firm level only for the weights used in the calculation
of effective tax rates, we average the data over time and use only the cross-
sectional variation. This sample, including non-European companies, is then
10More precisely in our model, this result applies only to investment financed by retained
earnings. Allowing for the parent lending to the subsidiary is more complex, and reintroduces
a small effect from the parent’s tax rate, t. Also, in calculating the cost of capital, we solve
for g in the new subsidiary, which may differ from the rate of profit in the parent.
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used to identify the group structures. A company is treated as part of a group if
the database reports a majority shareholder (more than 50% direct or indirect
shareholding) that is within our sample, or if a company is considered to be
part of a group if the database reports a global owner which itself has a BvD
identification number.
In order to have comparable numbers in each country, we limit the number
of companies we consider in each EU member state to 50,000 companies; this
reduces the sample size in France, Italy and Spain. This leaves us with a
sample of 366,383 companies for which all the necessary data is reported.11 Of
these, 85,197 companies are part of 16,537 corporate groups, of which 4,244
corporate groups operate in more than one European country. We combine
these data within the groups to end up with 297,723 observations. Each of these
observations is then attributed to the country of the parent company, unless
the corporate owner is outside Europe. In these cases we treat the highest level
owner in a European country as the parent. Table 1 summarises the country
coverage and the relevant variables that are used for the weighting of the firm
specific effective tax rates.
Table 1 about here
We consider investment in 5 different assets, shown in Table 1: buildings,
machinery, land, inventories and intangibles. The relevant shares for each in-
vestment are a combination of firm specific information combined with industry
specific information as provided by McKenzie et al (1998). Specifically we use
information about tangible and intangible fixed assets and inventories from BvD
and split the tangible assets further into buildings, machinery and land using
size-industry specific weights. The firm specific weights are defined as a propor-
tion of the sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets and inventories. For the
share of debt finance we use the firm specific ratio of current and non-current
liabilities to total assets.12
As already discussed, we use firm-specific ratios across these five assets, and
assume that the existing asset mix of the firm is mirrored in the new invest-
ment. The table shows average values for each country. Across the whole of
Europe, buildings and machinery both account for around 23% of total assets,
and inventories account for around 36%. Finally, the table also shows the av-
erage leverage ratio in each country; though again we use firm-specific values
below.
To calculate the applicable overall tax rate under a formula apportionment
system, we need to find the appropriate weighted average for groups that already
operate in more than one country. And for all companies, we need to find the
11We exclude observations with missing values for the relevant variables, and corporate
groups that report more than 100% debt or report zero values for all three asset variables,
stocks, tangibles and intangibles.
12For a more detailed description see Egger et al (2009).
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overall tax rate after the new subsidiary is set up. For existing multinational
groups, we weight the corporate tax rate in the countries in which the group
operates with the shares of the apportionment factors employed there. As
in Devereux and Loretz (2008), we use a composite apportionment factor with
weights of one third for turnover, one third for total assets, one sixth for number
of employees and one sixth for cost of employees.
5 Results
We analyse the dispersion of the tax burden under the current and the pro-
posed tax systems. We first present some numerical results for the EATRs and
a graphical presentation of these results. The results for the costs of capital
are subsequently presented only in graphical form.13 Finally we also discuss
the importance of the location of apportionment factors under a formula ap-
portionment system.
5.1 Effective Average Tax Rates
To get a first impression of the impact of the different tax systems it is useful to
examine the overall dispersion of the tax burden across all companies. As stated
above, we do so for three different scenarios: the current system (without the
possibility of international loss offset); a system of voluntary international loss
consolidation without formula apportionment; and a system with a common
consolidated tax base and formula apportionment.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 shows histograms of the EATRs for these three scenarios. Each
histogram shows the dispersion of more than 8 million effective tax rates as
we calculate the potential tax burden for 297,723 companies investing in all 27
European countries. As in all the figures, the graphs are arranged as follows.
The upper part of the figure displays the results for the current system, the
middle part for the voluntary loss offset and the lower part for the formula ap-
portionment system. Moving from the top downwards two main changes can be
observed. First, moving from the existing system to optional loss consolidation,
the distribution shifts to the left, indicating that allowing loss consolidation re-
duces EATRs. Further the middle part of Figure 1 shows that this reform
would also significantly increase the dispersion of EATRs. Note that because
the loss consolidation is assumed to be voluntary, the distribution only widens
at the lower tail. The lower part of the figure indicates that the overall tax
burden under a formula apportionment system is significantly reduced relative
to both of the other two systems. In this case, the lower tail is less pronounced,
13More detailed results are available from the authors on request.
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which reflects the fact that excessive tax savings due to loss consolidation are
not possible under a formula apportionment system.
To assess the impact on the EATRs in the individual member states, Table
2 compares the average EATRs for a domestic investment, and for inbound and
outbound foreign direct investment. For domestic investment the current sys-
tem and the voluntary consolidation lead to the same outcome as it is already
possible to consolidate domestic losses under the current system. Further, it
is always beneficial to use losses immediately in a domestic subsidiary because
the loss carry forward could only be used against the same tax rate in the
future. Even under formula apportionment the tax burden for domestic invest-
ment changes little; this is partly due to the fact the majority of our sample
are domestic firms, for which the tax rate remains unchanged. As a result the
differences in the domestic EATR across countries persist.
Comparing the domestic EATR under the current system with that for
either outbound or inbound investment it is evident that the lack of interna-
tional loss consolidation yields a higher EATR for international investment.
This is clearly inconsistent with CEN since domestic investment receives more
favourable tax treatment. While the average EATR for domestic investment
ranges between 7.7% for Bulgaria and 28.3% in Malta, the average EATR for
outbound investment ranges between 25.9% in Bulgaria and 40.5% in Malta.
Similarly the average EATR for inbound investment varies from 17.3% in
Cyprus to 39.2% in Malta.
Table 2 about here
Moving to a system of voluntary loss consolidation without formula appor-
tionment would over-correct the distortion between domestic and foreign in-
vestment, as foreign investment would receive more favourable treatment. On
average, the reform would generate a lower EATR of two percentage points
relative to domestic investment, though this difference is very unevenly dis-
tributed. In fact outbound investment from high tax countries would face a
significantly reduced tax burden (as subsidiaries in low tax countries could off-
set losses against the parent’s high tax rate), while outbound investment from
low tax countries would still face a high tax burden. Overall, the spread of the
average EATR for outbound investment is comparable to the current system,
with values between 17.7% for Belgium and 29.7% for Malta. For inbound in-
vestment, the attractiveness of low tax rate countries is amplified. For countries
with a combination of generous depreciation allowances and low statutory tax
rates, for example Lithuania, the average EATR for inbound investment would
be very low. This leads to an extremely large differential between country av-
erages for the EATR for inbound investment, with values as low as 1.8% for
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Lithuania and as high as 33.4% for Malta.
A switch to a formula apportionment system would reduce the differential
in the EATR between domestic investment and inbound investment. However,
the EATR still varies significantly across the different member states. Country
averages range from as little as 7.8% for investment into Bulgaria or Cyprus
to 28.2% for investment into Malta. However, for the outbound investment
the dispersion is significantly reduced, with a lowest average EATR of 17.3%
in Italy and a highest average of 21.1% in Cyprus. As described above, we
assume that the investment is proportional to the existing operations, which
implies that the effective tax burden including the feedback effect is mostly
determined by the host country tax rate. The discussion in subsection 5.3
shows an alternative scenario where there is no feedback effect and the effective
tax burden only depends on the home country tax rate.
5.1.1 Capital Export Neutrality
To evaluate the proximity of a tax system to CEN we go beyond an analysis of
country averages of EATRs to exploit firm level information. For an individual
company CEN holds if an investment faces the same tax treatment regardless
of where the investment takes place. This can be measured as the variation
between the EATRs a single firm would face on investment across all possible
country locations, including its home country. The lower this variation, the
closer the overall tax regime is to exhibiting capital export neutrality. The
first three columns of Table 3 summarise the standard deviation between the
EATRs for each of the 297,723 firms under the three tax systems considered
in the paper. Figure 2 shows the dispersion of these standard deviations across
all firms.
Figure 2 about here
Table 3 about here
In the top part of Figure 2, showing the distribution of company standard
deviations under the current system, a unusual distribution can be observed.
In fact, there are three distributions within this histogram. Starting from the
left, the first peak at a standard deviation of around 0.03 there are firms with
their headquarter in countries with a credit system and a relatively high tax
rate, like the United Kingdom, Greece or Malta.14 The smaller second peak at
14Note that our results are based on the tax laws in the year 2008, hence the recent change
to an exemption system in the United Kingdom is not taken into account.
14
a standard deviation of approximately 0.05 represents firms in a country with
a credit system and a moderate tax rate, e.g. the Czech Republic or Poland.
The large bulk of companies is located in either a country with an exemp-
tion system, or in a country with a relatively low corporate tax rate, which
effectively exempts foreign income from home country tax for most outbound
investment. These countries have a standard deviation of their EATRs between
0.06 and 0.1. These effects can also be seen clearly in the first column of Ta-
ble 3. Therefore, under the current system, capital export neutrality is to some
extent fulfilled for high tax credit countries, but less so for exemption countries.
The middle part of Figure 2 displays the distribution of standard deviations
under voluntary loss consolidation. Compared to the current system, there is a
widening in the right hand side of the distribution, and an increase in the aver-
age standard deviation. This represents a movement away from capital export
neutrality, as the standard deviations are generally higher. There is also an
increase in the spread of tax rates, which stems from the fact that parent com-
panies in low tax countries will not gain significantly from loss consolidation,
while those in high tax countries will benefit the most since losses made abroad
can be offset against tax at the parent’s high tax rate. Therefore, the firms
that face a low domestic tax burden, will face relatively high tax burdens for
outbound investment. At the same time firms with a relatively high domestic
tax burden will have increased low tax opportunities. This results in a average
standard deviation of 0.085, with values up to more than 0.2 for some firms.
The three distinct peaks for the different combinations of double taxation and
tax rate combinations are no longer apparent.
The lower part of Figure 2 presents the distribution of standard deviations
under a formula apportionment system. The overall distribution is slightly
further left than under the current system. However the two smaller peaks of
the credit countries disappear which implies that the overall improvement in
terms of capital export neutrality is only minor. This can also be seen in the
third column in Table 3 with a slightly reduced overall standard deviation of
0.059.
5.1.2 Market Neutrality
As discussed above, to assess whether these tax reforms would represent a
movement towards market neutrality we follow two approaches in identifying a
single EATR for each company. First, we assume that in supplying any given
market, a company faces its average EATR from investing in all 27 countries.
By comparing the distribution of this average EATR for each company, we can
then identify the extent to which some companies gain a competitive advantage
over others. The results of this approach are presented graphically in the upper
row of Figure 3 and on a more detailed basis for each country in the middle
three columns of Table 3.
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Figure 3 about here
Alternatively, we assume that each company will invest in the location which
generates the lowest EATR. In this case, market neutrality depends on the dis-
tribution of the minimum EATR for each company, across all companies. The
results from this second approach are presented graphically in the lower row of
Figure 3 and for each country in the last three columns of Table 3.
The upper left of Figure 3 presents the distribution of the average EATRs
across all companies under the current system without loss consolidation. Most
of the firms face an average EATR between 25% and 35% and both the upper
and lower tail are relatively short. This implies that the current system performs
reasonably well in terms of MN. The country averages in Table 3 strengthen
this impression, as they vary only moderately between 25.2% in Bulgaria and
40.0% in Malta.
In comparison, the lower left part of Figure 3 depicts the distribution of
the minimum EATRs for each company under the current system. Relative
to the average EATR in the upper row the distribution is shifted to the left
and is more dispersed. This is also reflected in the country averages in Table 3
where the differences across countries are larger than for the average EATRs,
ranging from 7.7% in Cyprus to 28.3% in Malta. Further comparing the min-
imum EATRs with those for domestic investment in Table 2 it can be seen
that the values are identical for all credit countries. This reflects the fact that
under a credit system with no consolidation of losses across borders, domestic
investment is the tax optimal strategy.
Introducing a voluntary system of loss consolidation would decrease both
the average and minimum EATRs but simultaneously increase their disper-
sion. From the upper middle part of Figure 3, it becomes evident that most
of the increased variation in the average EATRs would be in the lower tail.
This is due to the voluntary nature of this tax reform, which implies that firms
would claim no immediate group relief if this would increase their effective tax
burden. Hence, companies located in a high tax countries with an exemption
system could on average benefit more from the loss consolidation. The fact that
a high home country tax rate implies bigger tax savings through loss consoli-
dation is also reflected in the country averages in Table 3. The high tax and
exemption countries - Germany, Italy and Spain - become the home countries
with the lowest averages, all below 20%. At the other end of the spectrum
are the high tax and credit countries like Malta with 29.7% and the United
Kingdom and Greece. This is due to the fact that credit countries can only
benefit to a limited extent through claiming losses in lower-taxed subsidiaries
against highly taxed home country profits, because the absence of loss carry
forward increases the subsequent tax burden in the subsidiary. And in contrast
to the exemption countries these taxable profits are also subject to the higher
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tax rate of the home country upon repatriation. Further, low tax countries like
Cyprus or Ireland also cannot benefit from loss consolidation and therefore face
relatively large tax burdens. The increased dispersion of the average EATRs
represents a movement away from MN (using this measure), as the dispersion
across firms rises.
The lower middle part of Figure 3 displays the dispersion of the minimum
EATRs under a voluntary loss consolidation system and even more strongly
highlights the tax planning opportunities available under this system by re-
locating real investment. In this case, over half of the firms can direct the
investment to a country where it faces a negative EATR. On the other hand
some firms cannot benefit and face positive (minimum) EATRs of more than
30%. This increased dispersion of the minimum EATRs again represents a
movement away from market neutrality. From the second last column in Table
3 it can be seen that on average the minimum EATR is only 1.0%. High tax
exemption countries like Spain, Italy, Germany and France gain most, while
credit countries, like Malta, United Kingdom, Greece or the Czech Republic
gain less from the new tax incentives.
Under the assumption that formula apportionment would be introduced as
an obligatory measure, the distribution of the average EATRs would widen a
little, as can be seen in the upper right part of Figure 3, indicating a small
movement away from MN. However, compared to the current system, there is
a significant decrease in the average EATR. This is also apparent in Table 3
where the country averages now vary from 17.5% in Italy to 20.6% in Cyprus.
However, the distribution of the minimum EATRs, depicted in the lower
right of Figure 3, is much narrower than for average EATRs. In the last column
in Table 3 it can be observed that the country averages of the minimum EATRs
are very similar across countries. In contrast to a system of voluntary loss
consolidation system without formula apportionment, no large tax benefits of
loss consolidation exist (since it is not possible to offset a loss in a low tax rate
country against a profit in a high tax rate country). Hence there are no negative
minimum EATRs and the distribution in the lower right part of Figure 3 is
substantially less dispersed than for the current system. Under our assumption
that the allocation of apportionment factors is the same as the allocation of
taxable profit, the EATR is determined to a large extent by the tax rate in
the country of the new subsidiary. Consequently it varies only a little within
a given country, and the location of the minimum EATR may be common
amongst parents from different countries. On this measure then, there is a
substantial movement towards MN. Interestingly, the peak of the distribution
is also considerably below that for the current system, implying that firms face
on average a substantially lower minimum EATR.
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5.2 Cost of Capital
We also use our methodology to assess the cost of capital (CoC), a measure
that indicates the effect of the tax on the incentive to undertake an additional
marginal investment.15 We consider the proximity of the European CoCs to
CEN and MN following the same approach as for the EATR. Comparisons
based on the cost of capital are arguably more consistent with optimal tax
theory. The cost of capital is the relevant measure in the absence of economic
rent, and discrete investment choices, in which production efficiency is held to
be optimal. In fact, the comparisons based on the cost of capital are similar
to those based on the EATR. We therefore present the results briefly and
highlight where additional insight can be gained.
5.2.1 Capital Export Neutrality
As with the EATR we consider the standard deviation for any individual com-
pany across the CoCs which it would face in each of the 27 possible investment
locations: CEN holds for an individual firm if the standard deviation is zero.
Figure 4(a) displays the distribution of these standard deviations for the three
scenarios considered in this paper. Comparing the left hand side part of Figure
4(a) to the upper part of Figure 2 it can be seen that the three distinct peaks
in the distribution for the EATR under the current system are not present for
the CoC, indicating that the double taxation system is less important for a
marginal investment.
Figures 4 about here
Moving right in Figure 4(a) the same phenomena as for the EATR can be
observed for the CoC. Introducing a voluntary system of loss consolidation
without formula apportionment tends to increase the standard deviation for
a large proportion of the sample, and therefore represents a clear movement
away from CEN. A formula apportionment system tends to correct some of this
newly induced distortions, but is still further away from CEN than the current
system. This occurs despite the fact that the harmonized tax base is more
relevant for the cost of capital. The effect can be traced back to the fact that
this reform harmonises the tax base, but not the tax rate. To the extent that
countries have currently chosen a broad base/low rate combination or a narrow
base/high rate combination, then harmonising only the tax base can lead to
greater dispersion in the CoC.
15An alternative measure, the effective marginal tax rate, becomes meaningless in the case
of negative cost of capital. Given that in our voluntary consolidation scenario negative costs
of capital are easily possible and also observed, we only report results for the cost of capital.
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5.2.2 Market Neutrality
To assess the degree to which market neutrality is achieved, we consider the
distribution of the minimum cost of capital facing each company across its 27
possible investments. The distribution of this minimum cost of capital is shown
in Figure 4(b), and is again in line with the findings for the EATR. The
dispersion of tax burdens increases following the introduction of a system with
voluntary loss consolidation. This is shown in the middle part of Figure 4(b),
where the distribution is more dispersed and shifted even further to the left.
Given our parameterisation (a real interest rate of 5 per cent), a CoC of 5 per
cent translates into an effective marginal tax rate of zero. This implies that
almost all firms have at least one location where they face a negative effective
marginal tax rate.
Figure 5 about here
Like the case of the distribution of minimum EATRs, the formula appor-
tionment system leads to a narrower dispersion of minimum CoCs, as shown
in the right hand part of the Figure, although on average there is a rise in the
minimum CoC.
5.3 The allocation of apportionment factors
In modelling the effects of the formula apportionment system, we have so far
assumed that the allocation of apportionment factors is proportional to the
allocation of taxable income between the existing group of companies and the
new subsidiary. As noted above, this implies that it is primarily the statutory
tax rate in the country of the new subsidiary, rather than in the country of the
existing company, which determines the EATR and CoC. As an alternative,
we now briefly present the case in which the EATR and the CoC depend only
on the tax rate of the parent company, or existing group of companies. This
would be the case if none of the factors in the apportionment formula were
located in the country of the subsidiary.16
Since the tax base would be harmonised across countries, and in this case
the overall tax rate is independent of the location of the subsidiary, then the
EATR and CoC are also independent of the country of the subsidiary. Con-
sequently any given firm faces the same EATR and CoC regardless where it
invests. This implies that CEN is completely achieved.
Given that CEN is completely achieved, the minimum and average effective
tax rate are the same for any individual firm. Hence, there is only one EATR
16In principle, the investment may be strategically adjusted to influence the overall statutory
tax rate. However, we do not address this possibility here.
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and one CoC for each company to consider in assessing the proximity to MN.
Figure 5 presents this minimum/average EATRs of all the companies in our
dataset. Comparing the distribution in Figure 5 to the two graphs on the right
hand side in Figure 3 two features are evident. First, there is a significant shift
to the right. This is partly due to the geographical breakdown of our sam-
ple, since the large number of companies in Italy, France, Spain and Germany
translates, under these assumptions, into a overall higher EATR. Second the
distribution is much more dispersed than in Figure 3, indicating that, under
this alternative assumption, a formula apportionment system would represent
a move away from MN. This is broadly the opposite result to our base case
of a proportional new investment. While the persisting tax rate differentials
between the member states led to a violation of CEN under the assumption of
a proportional new investment, they imply a move away from MN under the
assumption of unchanged apportionment factors.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a methodology for assessing whether corporation taxes in
open economies are consistent with two forms of neutrality: capital export neu-
trality and market neutrality. We assess the extent to which location decisions
of companies are likely to be affected by taxes by comparing the effective tax
rates faced by individual companies investing in each of the 27 EU member
states. We assess the extent to which competition between companies may be
affected by taxes by comparing a representative effective tax rate for each com-
pany across a large number of companies in the EU. The paper applies this
methodology to compare existing corporation tax systems in the Europe Union
with two alternatives: optional international loss consolidation, and formula
apportionment in the form of the proposed Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base (CCCTB).
We show that the current system gives an advantage to domestic invest-
ment because of the lack of international consolidation. As a result, the current
system does not meet the requirements for either capital export neutrality nor
market neutrality. Introducing a system of voluntary consolidation would partly
correct the distortion between domestic and international investment. However,
such a tax reform would introduce other distortions, and in general would imply
a move away from both forms of neutrality.
In contrast, a change to a formula apportionment system would have some
desirable efficiency effects. First, the tax differential between domestic and
international investment would be mitigated, and under most scenarios there
would be a small improvement towards CEN. Also, in some cases, we find a
significant improvement towards MN. However, the results are dependent on
the assumptions made. In our base case, in which the activities of the new
subsidiary are proportional to those of the existing company, then there is
generally a movement towards MN. However, if instead apportionment factors
20
are not present in the new subsidiary, then CEN is achieved, but there is a
movement away from MN.
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Figure 1: Histograms of EATR
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Figure 2: Histograms of standard deviation of EATR
28
010203040
Density
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
Ex
is
tin
g 
Sy
st
em
®
010203040
Density
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
Co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n
®
010203040
Density
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
Fo
rm
ul
a 
Ap
po
rti
on
m
en
t
®
A
ve
ra
ge
s
of
E
A
T
R
s
010203040
Density
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
Ex
is
tin
g 
Sy
st
em
®
010203040
Density
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
Co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n
®
010203040
Density
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
Fo
rm
ul
a 
Ap
po
rti
on
m
en
t
®
M
in
im
u
m
s
of
E
A
T
R
s
F
ig
ur
e
3:
H
is
to
gr
am
s
of
av
er
ag
e
an
d
m
in
im
u
m
E
A
T
R
29
0200400600
Density
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
Ex
is
tin
g 
Sy
st
em
®
0200400600
Density
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
Co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n
®
0200400600
Density
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
Fo
rm
ul
a 
Ap
po
rti
on
m
en
t
®
(a
)
H
is
to
g
ra
m
s
o
f
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
o
f
C
oC
020406080100
Density
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
Ex
is
tin
g 
Sy
st
em
®
020406080100
Density
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
Co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n
®
020406080100
Density
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
Fo
rm
ul
a 
Ap
po
rti
on
m
en
t
®
(b
)
H
is
to
g
ra
m
s
o
f
m
in
im
u
m
C
oC
F
ig
ur
e
4:
St
an
da
rd
D
ev
ia
ti
on
an
d
M
in
im
um
of
C
oC
s.
30
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Formula Apportionment
®
Figure 5: Minimum and average EATR for the case λ = 0
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